

CONFUCIAN ROLE ETHICS:
A VISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

Henry Rosemont, Jr.

Brown University

Introduction

The title of this paper suggests a study in comparative ethics, and in part that is just what it is. But it is more nearly contrastive than comparative, and more importantly, I want to contrast not ethical theories, but one of the basic *presuppositions* on which virtually all Western ethical theories are based with a different presupposition, namely the one that undergirds the Confucian view of the good life for human beings, and what makes for an optimally decent society.

After sketching briefly the Western presupposition that I want to criticize I will consider equally briefly two major patterns of contemporary moral thinking in the Western-dominated contemporary world, and then contrast them with some basic views of the early Confucians, and then go on to argue that the latter provides a more adequate social and philosophical foundation for world-wide acceptance of all the rights enumerated in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights than do the Western views that currently dominate not only philosophical and political thinking, especially in the U.S., but underlie much that is done by the legislative and judicial branches of our state and federal governments, and many international agencies as well. These early Confucian views I bring together constitute what I call “Role Ethics,” but this too, can be misleading, for as I will claim, the Confucian orientation is not so much a theory – of ethics or anything else – as it is simply a way of life.¹

Human Beings as Individuals

For most of the past two-plus centuries – in a process of evolution that stretches back to Greek and early Christian antiquity – the basic conception of what it is to be a human being in Western civilization has been *individualism*.² That we are social creatures, strongly influenced by the others with whom we interact, has always been acknowledged on all sides, but has not been seen as of the essence of our humanity at the philosophical level, nor of compelling worth. The reason for this is that our social situations are in an important sense accidental, in that we have exercised no control over a great many of them – i.e., who our parents are, the native language(s) we acquire, our citizenship, and so forth. As a consequence, what gives human beings their primary worth, their dignity, integrity and value on this account – and what must command the respect of all – is their ability to act purposively, to have a capacity for self-governance, i.e., *autonomy*.³

This skeletal view of human beings can be fleshed out by considering what other qualities must inhere in them in order for the concept of the autonomous individual to become robust and not barren. Individuals must be *rational*⁴ if they are to be autonomous; that is to say, they must be capable of going against instinct, emotion or conditioning, for creatures that cannot so act are surely not autonomous. Further, human beings must have *freedom*⁵ as another defining characteristic; if they were not free to rationally choose between alternative courses of action, and then act on the choices made, how could they be said to be autonomous? We see these linked qualities clearly when we ask “Why did you do that?” as a moral question. Clearly it assumes the individual was free to have done otherwise, and that he or she can give reasons for their choice, i.e., they behaved rationally.

In addition, although the quality of being self-interested is not strictly entailed by this basic view of human beings, it has been standard in most of philosophy (and virtually all of economics) since before the Enlightenment and the rise of industrial capitalism in the West.

Further, these qualities of individual human beings as most fundamentally autonomous, rational, and free (self-interest has been less enthusiastically applauded by some)⁶ are taken as unalloyed goods in the ethical sense. For example, the major stumbling block for opponents of *Roe v. Wade* in

their struggles to have it overturned is that doing so would clearly restrict the freedom of women to rationally choose the course of action they wanted to follow with respect to their pregnancy. While abortions are never anything to celebrate, restricting human freedom to choose rationally what to do – especially with respect to one’s own body -- is always *prima facie* very wrong, because individuals have an inalienable right, as Jefferson put it, to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

If we define human beings in this individualistic manner, it would seem to follow that in thinking about how we ought to deal morally with our fellows we should seek as abstract and general a viewpoint as possible. If *everyone* has the (highly valued) qualities associated with individualism, and it is just these qualities we must respect at all times, then their gender, age, ethnic background, religion, skin color, and so on, should play no significant role in our decisions about how to interact with them morally (apart from concern for ethically irrelevant details). Thus, on this orientation it is incumbent upon us to seek universal principles and values – applicable to all peoples at all times – or else the hope of a world at peace, devoid of group conflicts, racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnocentrism could never be realized.

Moreover, the best way to do this is obviously to strive to ignore and transcend our own spatio-temporal location and cultural tradition, to overcome, that is, our personal prejudices, hopes, fears, likes and dislikes and on the basis of reason alone ascertain beliefs and principles that should be compelling to all other rational persons equally ignoring and transcending their specific locations, backgrounds and biases. Our differing heritages, personalities, sexual orientations, perspectives and much more divide us, and are a major source of conflict; but all normal human beings have a capacity to reason, which thus unites us all, and consequently offers a greater hope for a less violent human future than has been the case in the past, and at present.

This emphasis on the use of reason, on objectivity, impartiality, and abstraction has provided strong support for arguments in favor of universalism in ethics. Many people, and most Western philosophers, have been persuaded by it, not unreasonably; it is a strong argument, complete with a

vision of peace, freedom, and equality, which make the rare challenges to this position seem either hopelessly relativistic, authoritarian, or both.

Deontological and Utilitarian Ethical Theories

I want to rehearse very briefly two such universalistic ethical theories, grounded in the concept of the individual I have just outlined, not because they are not very well known to the reader, but so s/he will have a better understanding of how I see these theories in contrast to the Confucian vision. These two theories, which have dominated Western moral philosophy since the Enlightenment period, are deontological ethics, emphasizing our moral duties, and Utilitarianism, which focuses on attending to the consequences of what we do in the moral sphere. The former is associated with Immanuel Kant, whose fundamental moral principle, the Categorical Imperative, is roughly “Always act on a maxim you could will to become a universal law.” Kant sought to establish a certain, universally valid basis for human moral behavior that could withstand relativistic and skeptical challenges: that is, he believed he had structured the logic of moral arguments such that they would reveal our unconditional moral obligations without reference to historical experience, inclination, or personal values. The substance of our autonomy, for Kant, is thus an inner rational faculty uncorrupted by external circumstances, enabling us to develop and then comply with moral imperatives; an autonomy, that is, devoid of our particularities as unique individuals living in a specific time, place, and culture.⁷

Utilitarianism was developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill three-quarters of a century after Kant, and its most fundamental principle is to act so as to maximize the utility or happiness of the greatest number of people (with the minimal disutility and unhappiness for the rest). For Kant, logic reigns, the primary focus being on compliance and consistency rather than consequences; for Bentham and Mill the situation is more nearly – but not quite – reversed, since probabilities instead of certainties must weigh heavily in a moral agent’s calculations about the consequences of his or her actions in accordance with the Principle of Utility. For Bentham and Mill, calculating benefits or happiness is the proper employment of reason to be applied to our moral deliberations. Like Kant’s Categorical Imperative, however, the principle is universal, applicable to any and all moral situations.

And in each of those situations, every individual counts for one, and no one counts for more than one. It is only by not attending to any individual's particularities – again, time, place and culture – that Utilitarians believe true justice and equality can be achieved.⁸

Both of these universalistic ethical theories have had, and continue to have numerous champions in philosophy, theology, and political theory, and they have had, and continue to have, a great deal of influence in other circles as well. In general, the influence of Kant can be seen fairly clearly in the United States courts, where consistency and precedent are prized, even if at times the consequences of the decision are untoward (Think of famous cases like *Dred Scott*, or *Miranda*). Legislators, on the other hand, typically look to consequences when enacting laws, and find no problem in repealing a law when the consequences of the law appear to become adverse. (Repeal of prohibition, the draft, etc.).

I shall have more to say about the universalistic ethics of Kant, Bentham and Mill as we proceed, but against this very brief conceptual background of contemporary moral – and political – theory, let us turn now to the early Confucians and a very different kind of ethical orientation that stems from a different view of what it is to be a human being.

Human Beings as Interrelated

The views I want to consider under the heading of classical Confucianism were set down in four texts written and edited roughly between the fifth and second centuries BCE: *The Analects of Confucius*, *the Mencius*, *the Xunzi*, and the *Li Ji*, or *Records of Ritual*. These four works are by no means in full agreement on all points, and there are several tensions within each work itself. Moreover, there are many highly ambiguous passages in all of these works, sufficient that reading them is often a creative act. Nevertheless, in conjunction with a few other early texts that achieved canonical status – the Books of *Changes*, *Poetry*, and *History* – these works do present an overall coherent view of the good society and the good life for human beings therein. This good life is an altogether social one, and central to understanding and appreciating it is to see that Confucian

sociality has aesthetic, political, and spiritual no less than moral dimensions, all of which we must learn to integrate if we are to lead worthy lives. It must be emphasized at the outset that the Confucian good life for human beings is not so much a *goal* of human life – something to be achieved and then maintained --as it is a *way* of human life, the *ren dao*. It is how and why, like Thoreau to a certain extent, we endeavor to live our lives deliberately, and well.⁹

In the same way, none of the early texts address the question of the meaning *of* life, but they do put forward a vision and discipline in which everyone can find a meaning *in* life. This meaning will become increasingly clear as we pursue the full realization of our humanity, namely, developing ourselves most fully as human beings to become *jun zi* “exemplary persons,” or, at the pinnacle of development, *sheng ren*, or “sages.” And for Confucians we can only do this through our interactions with other human beings. Treading this human path (*ren dao*) must be ultimately understood as most fundamentally a religious journey, even though the canon speaks not of God, nor of creation, salvation, an immortal soul, or a transcendental realm of being; and no prophecies will be found in its pages either. It is nevertheless a truly religious path, followed in concert with others. As Confucius remarked: “I cannot run with the birds and beasts. Am I not one among the people of this world? If not them, with whom can I associate?” (18.6).¹⁰ Herbert Fingarette has well summed up this orientation succinctly: “For Confucius, unless there are at least two human beings, there are no human beings.”

Role-Bearing Persons

By emphasizing our sociality, the Confucians simultaneously emphasize our relationality: an abstract individual I am not, but rather a son, husband, father, grandfather, teacher, student, colleague, neighbor, friend, and more. In all of these roles I am defined in large measure by the other(s) with whom I interact, highly specific personages related to me in one way or another; they are not abstract autonomous individuals. I *live* rather than “play” these roles, and when all of them have been specified, and their interrelationships made manifest, then I have been thoroughly individuated, but

with nothing left over with which to piece together an autonomous individual self. Being thus the aggregate sum of the roles I live, it must follow that as my roles change, so do I. Marriage made me a different person, as did becoming a father, and later, grandfather. Divorce or becoming a widower would change me yet again. While my role as student never disappears, it was overshadowed after my formal studies were completed as I became a professor. Former students become young friends, young friends become old friends, all of which have an effect on who I am and am defined. All the more so is this true when old and cherished friends and relatives die, making me yet again different.

Moreover, a moment's reflection on our interpersonal behavior from this perspective should suggest that seeking an *essential* self, something that remains constant and unchanging throughout the vicissitudes of our lives, might be like chasing a will-o'-the-wisp, for we are basically constituted by the roles we live in the midst of others.¹¹ Does not our tone of voice change when speaking to our parents and then to a friend? Is our demeanor the same with a lover as with a younger sibling? Is the visage we present to neighbors the same we present to strangers? For virtually all of us, I believe, the answer to these and similar questions is "No," and if so, then in an important sense, we might come to understand that who we "really are" is a function of who we are with, when, and under what circumstances.

It follows from this perspective that we are all consistently changing, our sense of continuity through memory notwithstanding, and therefore any goal of human perfectibility can never be fully realized; the *ren dao* of the early Confucians is not so much achieved, as led, as I suggested briefly earlier, and as Confucius put it succinctly in the *Analects*: "People can broaden the way (*dao*); the way cannot broaden people." (15.29). Moreover, we must strive to broaden the way with diligence throughout our lives. As one of the major disciples of Confucius commented in the *Analects*:

Master Zeng said: "Scholar-apprentices (*shi*) cannot but be strong and resolved, for they bear a heavy charge and their way (*dao*) is long. Where they take authoritative/benevolent conduct (*ren*) as their charge, is it not a heavy one? And where their way ends

only in death, is it not indeed long?’ (8.7)

Although this early Confucian view of the human being is very different from the abstract autonomous individual, rational, free, and probably self-interested locus of moral analysis current in Western philosophical, legal, and political thinking today, it is, I hope, not seen as remote from ourselves, for the Confucian view is, I believe, a fairly straightforward account of our actual lives. In order to be a friend, neighbor, or lover, for example, I must have a friend, neighbor, or lover. Other persons are not merely accidental or contingent to my goal of following the path of being as fully human as possible, they are essential to it. Indeed, they confer personhood on me, and do so continuously; to the extent I live the role of a teacher students are necessary to my life, not incidental to it. It must also be noted in this regard that again, while Confucianism should be seen as fundamentally religious, there are no solitary monks, nuns, anchorites, anchoresses or hermits to be found in the tradition. The way is made in the walking of it, but one never walks alone.

Our first, and always most fundamental role, a role that defines us in significant measure throughout our lives, is as children; *xiao*, which I translate as “family reverence,” rather than “filial piety,”¹² is one of the highest excellences of integrated thought and feeling to be nurtured in Confucianism. We owe unswerving loyalty to our parents, and our manifold obligations to them do not cease at their death. As Confucius said in the *Analects*,

While [the parents] are alive, serve them according to the observances of ritual propriety; when they are dead, bury them and sacrifice to them according to the observances of ritual propriety. (2.5)

From our initial role as sons and daughters – and as siblings, playmates and pupils – we mature to become parents ourselves, and become as well spouses or lovers, neighbors, workmates, colleagues, friends. All of these are *reciprocal* relationships (which translates *shu*, another Confucian excellence),

best described as holding between benefactors and beneficiaries. (*shang/xia*: not “superiors/inferiors” which has been all-too-common in Western interpretations of early Confucianism). The roles are thus clearly hierarchical (but not elitist); each of us moves from benefactor to beneficiary and back again, depending on the other(s) with whom we are interacting, when, and under what conditions. When young I was largely beneficiary of my parents; when they became old and infirm, I became benefactor, and the same holds with my children. I am benefactor of my friend when she needs my help, beneficiary when I need hers. Taken together the manifold roles we live define us as unique persons, undergoing changes throughout our lives, and the ways we instantiate these relations is the means whereby we achieve dignity, satisfaction, and meaning in life.

The ideal Confucian society is thus basically family and communally oriented, with customs, traditions and rituals serving as the binding force of and between our many relationships and the obligations attendant on them. To understand this point fully we must construe the term *li*, translated as “ritual propriety,” not simply as referring to weddings, bat mitzvahs, holidays and funerals, but equally as referring to the simple customs and courtesies given and received in greetings, sharing food, caring for the sick, leave-takings, and much more: to be fully social, Confucians must at all times be polite and mannerly in their interactions with others. And these interactions should be performed with both grace and joy. We are all taught to say “Thank you” – a small ritual – when we receive a gift or a kindness from someone. From the Confucian perspective, however, to say “Thank you” is also to *give* a gift, a small kindness, signaling to the other that they have made a difference, great or slight, in your life.

It is somewhat paradoxical that while the views we are considering were put forth almost 2500 years ago, when China was in the early stages of the Iron Age, contemporary developments in technology and medicine have made us more, not less dependent on others, and hence the Confucian views should be seen as of great potential relevance to our present circumstances, as we prepare for the future, both personally and with respect to the state’s provision of social services. As the recent Kass Commission on Bioethics put it in their “President’s Report,” The defining characteristic of our

time seems to be that “We are both younger longer and older longer.” The former is in large measure due to economic pressures, the latter to advances in medicine and technology. In other words, we are spending more years when we are young and old being cared for by others, and much of the time in between caring for others. Both childhood and “old age” are thus being redefined, and so, consequently, must we also see differently what it is to be in “the prime of life.”¹³

This, then, in brief compass is the Confucian persuasion in action: relating to and with others as benefactors and beneficiaries in an intergenerational context, and deriving increasingly deep satisfaction from so doing. Confucius himself was absolutely clear on this point, for when a disciple asked him what he would most like to do, he said:

I would like to bring peace and contentment to the aged,
share relationships of trust and respect with friends, and
love and protect the young. (5.26)

For all of these reasons I believe Confucianism is best described as a “Role Ethics” (even though it is not, strictly speaking, an ethical theory), and it is unique in this regard. In the first place, it does not employ or seek universal principles, because what we should do depends on who we are doing it with, and when. Confucianism is much more particularistic,¹⁴ in that we are always to do what is *yi*, appropriate, in a given situation, and what might well be appropriate for me to do with my grandmother may differ significantly from what I should do if it is my younger brother in that situation, as we have already noted, and it may differ from what it might be appropriate for you to do with your grandmother, whose physical features and personality may well differ from my grandmother’s.

Confucian particularism is normally seen in Western moral philosophy as decidedly inferior to universalism (Kant thought Confucius knew nothing of morality.)¹⁵ But we may nevertheless make generalizations from the canon that are no less important today than two thousand years ago: when interacting with the elderly, be reverent, caring, obedient; when dealing with peers, don’t treat them

as you would dislike being treated; with the young, be nurturing, careful, loving, exemplary. Of course we did not learn these generalizations as moral principles when we were young. But it is on the basis of many and varied loving interactions with my grandmother that I learned long ago to develop an approximate sense of how to interact appropriately with other grandmothers. Now compared to most issues in contemporary Western moral philosophy -- abortion, suicide, euthanasia, intellectual property rights, genetic engineering, etc. -- the importance of making birthday cards for our grandmothers seems incredibly trivial, not even deserving of consideration as a moral issue.

But as the early Confucian canon reveals with surety, these homely little activities are the basic "stuff" of our human interactions, and Confucius is telling us that if we learn to get the little things right on a day-in and day-out basis, the so-called "big" things will take care of themselves. And in addition to grandmothers and other elders, the "little things" involve our close interactions with peers, and those younger than ourselves, and in this way begin to bring home to each of us our common humanity, for all of us will go through these phases of life. I can only begin to fully actualize my moral and spiritual potential when I have learned from my interactions with my own grandmother that although each grandmother is surely unique, they share qualities, live roles, and interact with others such that, in one sense, when you've learned to fully appreciate your own grandmother(s), you've come a long way toward appreciating fully all grandmothers, despite differences in skin color, ethnicity, religion or other characteristics. Grounded in family relations and extending outward therefrom, the moral epistemology of early Confucian is fairly simple and straightforward.

We cannot, however, simply "go through the motions" of following custom, tradition, and ritual in our interactions, nor should we fulfill our obligations mainly because we have been made to feel obliged to fulfill them, else we will not continue to develop our humanity. Rather must we make them our own, and modify them as needed. Remember that for Confucius, many of our obligations are not, cannot be, freely chosen. But he would insist, I believe, that freedom is an achievement term, not a stative one, and we can only begin to become truly free when we want to fulfill our

obligations, when we want to help others (be benefactors), and enjoy being helped by others (as beneficiaries).

Being thus altogether bound to and with others, it must follow that the more I contribute to their flourishing, the more I, too, flourish; conversely, the more my behaviors diminish others -- by being racist, sexist, nationalistic, homophobic, etc. -- the more I am diminished thereby. To be sure, Chinese society was highly patriarchal throughout much of its history, and the history of Chinese women consequently at least as bleak as that of their European sisters. At the same time -- and again, like Europe -- China had no shortage of despotic monarchs, toadying officials, abusive parents and dull pedants. But it is important to note that these kinds of people are thoroughly condemned in the classical texts, with very, very little justification for such sorry behaviors; how and why such behaviors became common in much of both imperial Chinese social life *despite* what is actually found in the *Analects* and the other early Confucian writings has not received the attention from scholars, Western and Chinese that it surely should. Put another way, my claim here is that the vision of classical Confucianism can be retained today with its integrity basically intact while yet condemning and struggling against sexism, racism, homophobia, subservience and elitism of any kind.

In saying that I can only flourish as I contribute to the flourishing of others, and am diminished when I diminish others, I hope it is clear that I am not proffering here a Confucian view of selfless or altruistic behavior, for this would imply that I have a (free, autonomous, individual) self to surrender. But this of course would beg the question against the Confucians, whose views clearly show the supposed dichotomy between selfishness and altruism as a Western conceit, as well as the equally Manichean split on which it is based: the individual vs. the collective. Overcoming these deeply rooted dichotomies in Western thought is not at all easy, but once the ingrained abstract image of the free, rational, self-interested autonomous individual begins to blur, very different possibilities for envisioning the human condition and the good society can present themselves if we are willing to look for them.

Is Classical Confucianism A Virtue Ethics?

I hope that I have made clear how very different the Confucian persuasion is from the moral philosophies of Kant, Bentham and Mill. In the last several decades uneasiness with some of the implications of these universalistic moral systems has led some Western philosophers to undertake a re-evaluation and reinterpretation of Aristotle's virtue ethics. Instead of asking, "What principles should guide my moral actions?" we should perhaps be asking "What kind of moral qualities should I endeavor to develop?"¹ Following up on these recent developments in Western moral theory, many comparative philosophers are given to characterizing Confucianism as a "virtue ethics"² as, e.g. in the original work of P.J. Ivanhoe, May Sim, Lee Yearley and Yu Jiyuan, among others. But I believe this ascription is at best misleading, even when the Greek *aretai* is more properly translated as "excellences" rather than "virtues." Too much that is *sui generis* in Confucianism is lost when an Aristotlean overlay is placed on the classical texts. Perhaps we may understand the concept of role ethics more substantively by pointing up how and why it is not amenable to an Aristotlean analysis without distortion.

In the first place, Aristotle was writing largely for and about a warrior aristocracy, and the Confucians were anything but approving of warriors. More importantly, a virtue theory of ethics seems to require the postulate of universal character traits as a part of human nature,³ and while the

¹ Some anthologies in this topic are *Vive and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics*, ed. Christina Hoff Sommers (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), and *Virtue and Vice*, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul *et al.* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). While most virtue ethicists have broken with the methodology of seeking universal principles in moral philosophy, they overwhelmingly continue to embrace individualism. See, for example, "Autonomy vs. Virtue? – A Virtue-Ethical Defense of Ethical Individualism," by Martin Wollroth, in *Chinese Ethics in a Global Context*, *op.cit.*

² See, for example, Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Filial Piety as a Virtue, [get citation], or a number of the papers in an anthology he edited with Rebecca Walker, *Working Virtue* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also articles such as Stephen A. Wilson, "Conformity, Individuality, and the Nature of Virtue: A Classical Confucian Contribution to Contemporary Ethical Reflection," in *Confucius and the Analects*, ed. Brian W. Van Norden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

³ David Wong explores this charge as raised by Gilbert Harman and John Doris (in separate works). He responds well to the challenge, but not in a way that would please any virtue ethicist committed to individualism. "If We Are Not By Ourselves, If We are not Strangers," in *Polishing the Chinese Mirror*:

writings of the early Confucians certainly cohere, they are by no means in agreement on the constitution of human nature. They all presume that human beings -- or in the Confucian case human "becomings" --are open to culturally-generated patterns of behavior and taste, a position that is very different from presumed biological or metaphysical uniformities.⁴

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An even more significant difference between the Confucian and the Aristotelian visions is that many of the latter's excellences may be cultivated in solitude, but, as I have emphasized, the Confucian's social, moral, and political progress requires others at all times. To be sure, Aristotle's virtuous people must live in a *polis*, but a number of his excellences --especially the Socratic fundamental trio of temperance, courage and wisdom—do not require others. They *may* be cultivated in social situations, but they need not be: we can resist the temptation for third helpings of dessert when we are dining alone; test our bravery by sky-diving, bull-fighting, or in many other ways defy death that do not require others; and of course we read, and usually reflect on things, by ourselves. Confucians, on the other hand, only become *junzi* – exemplary persons – after a lengthy and continuous process of performing their roles appropriately with the others to whom they are related, kin and non-kin alike. In just this way, it must follow from the Confucian vision that we need to look at the patient equally with the agent in ascertaining the extent to which the valued personal qualities have been properly developed; role ethics is not about actions, but interactions. Aristotelians may judge the moral worth of another by the actions they engage in; Confucians require us to focus equally on whom we are engaged with, and under what specific circumstances.

Similarly, Aristotle's persons have roles, but they are highly general, basically Greek/male/warrior/citizen. Confucian particularity, however, calls our attention at all times to *this* son, *this* grandmother, *this* student, *this* neighbor, all of them specific, all of them constitutive of who we are.

Essays in Honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Chicago and LaSalle,IL: Open Court Publishing Co., forthcoming 2007).

⁴ Most especially, Xunzi. See the "Human Nature is Evil" Chapter in *Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings, op.cit.*

Another way in which virtue ethics resonates with the deontic and utilitarian models outlined above, but not with the Confucian, is that all three of the former are dependent upon rational calculation to determine moral conduct. Aristotle's doctrine of the mean no less than compliance with the moral law or the application of the principle of utility is a rational exercise.

This is not at all to suggest that the Confucians can't think straight (are irrational) or don't care about intelligence (are non-rational) or are distrustful of it (are anti-rational). There is a seat of thought in Confucian biology, the *xin*, originally a picture of the aorta. But there's a catch: the *xin* is also the seat of our feelings, and consequently the cognitive/affective split so ubiquitous in modern Western philosophy can't even be easily made in classical Chinese. To be sure, at times the narrative context makes clear an emphasis the cognitive in some places, at others the affective; but there are no Confucian beliefs devoid of emotional content, no altogether non-rational emotions. Aristotle no less than Kant, Bentham and Mill work within what might be characterized as a loose rational-choice theoretical perspective, and Confucians do not make ethical choices in this purely rational sense.

(Strictly speaking, they don't make choices at all). *Rather, dispositions to behave in one way as opposed to another most often do not entail calculation at all, emerging spontaneously out of a cultivated sense of appropriateness within family and communal relations. Here the analogy of the artist is most perhaps appropriate, bringing the full inventory of one's experience to bear in bringing brush to paper or in throwing a pot, or in giving a shoulder rub to grandmother. If I must attempt to formulate a universalizable maxim for giving shoulder rubs to grandmothers, or calculate the utility or disutility of doing so; if I have to do these things when my grandmother requests a shoulder rub, or think about it at all, then, at least for Confucius (and for many more of us, I suspect), I am not at all an admirable grandchild.*

I submit that this early Confucian way of seeing ourselves, as most basically co-members of a family, of groups, of communities, of the human race, can easily lead to a conception of human rights far more robust and substantial than that which currently dominates our moral, political, and legal

thinking, especially in the United States. If what binds us together is felt more strongly than what separates or individuates us, we can come to appreciate that every person has dignity, and insist on a more equitable distribution of material goods and opportunities sufficient for each person to not simply achieve and maintain dignity, and flourish, but also to be able to contribute to the flourishing of others.

To suggest how this might be accomplished, I want to turn our attention now directly to the concept of human rights.

The Discourse on Human Rights¹⁶

If one of the defining characteristics of the autonomous individual is freedom – and it is irrelevant whether this definition is taken as descriptive or prescriptive – then it would seem to follow that no one, and especially no government, should curtail my freedom to engage in very basic human activities such as saying whatever I believe should be said, associate with whomever I wish, accept any set of religious beliefs I hold true, and dispose of any land or material goods I have legally acquired as I see fit. In the United States these are the most basic of freedoms, and it is claimed I have an inalienable right to them; to flourish I must be secure in the enjoyment of these rights/freedoms, entering only the caveat that I do not infringe the rights of others.

For Americans these rights – these freedoms – are protected by the Bill of Rights. They are civil and political in nature, and are now commonly referred to as “first generation” rights, and of course much of the plausibility of seeing these civil and political rights as the most basic stems from the concomitant view of seeing human beings as basically autonomous individuals. During the course of the 20th Century in the U.S. these basic rights have been extended beyond the human realm to corporations; these, too are seen to be free, autonomous, supposedly rational and certainly self-interested profit-maximizing entities that must be secure in the enjoyment of these rights no less than individuals if they are to prosper, and bring prosperity to the nation.

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, goes far beyond civil

and political rights. It declares (Articles 22-27) that human beings have fundamental economic, social and cultural rights, or “second generation” rights. Civil and political rights are often described as negative, following Isaiah Berlin, which can be misleading. But they are surely passive, in that they are invoked to guarantee freedom *from* coercion. Second generation rights, on the other hand, are active, intended to obviate social and natural impediments *to* the full realization of our human potential: the right to an education, a job, health care, decent housing, and so on; without these rights, the U.N. Declaration claims, concepts of human freedom and autonomy are hollow.

"Freedom from" and "freedom to" are clearly distinct, and "freedom from" can loom large in our political thinking if our major concern is focused solely on the threat of authoritarian governments or the supposed “tyranny of the majority”. But if we combine moral and political considerations, and ask what it means for each of us as persons, not governments, to respect the rights of others, things look rather different. That first generation rights are basically passive can be seen from the fact that 99% of the time I can fully respect all of your civil and political rights simply by ignoring you; you surely have the right to speak, but no right to have me listen. Second generation rights, on the other hand, are active in the sense that there are things I must do (pay more taxes, at the very least) if you are to secure them. Put another way, schools, medicines, jobs, food security, affordable housing, hospitals, and so on, do not fall from the sky; they are human creations. And herein lies a fundamental conflict in all contemporary discourses on human rights grounded in the concept of the autonomous individual: *to whatever extent I am obliged to assist in the creation of those goods which accrue to you by virtue of having second generation rights, to just that extent I cannot be an altogether autonomous individual, enjoying first generation rights, free to rationally decide upon and pursue my own projects rather than having to assist you with yours.*

That I, too, can have the second generation rights to these goods is of no consequence if I believe, like all libertarian, most conservative, and even a few liberal theorists, that I can secure them on my own, or in free contractual association with some others, and thereby need to keep secure only my civil and political rights. It is equally irrelevant logically that I can freely choose to assist

you in securing those goods necessary for the positive exercise of your freedom on my own initiative, for that would be an act of charity, not an acknowledgement of your rights to them, or an obligation on my part to help you secure them. (Note that while the number of philanthropists among the super-rich is increasing somewhat, they decide how and where their monies will be spent; to the best of my knowledge, none of them suggest paying more taxes to enable a democratically-elected government to distribute goods as needed.)

Arguments for second generation rights have a special force in developing nations but apply as well to the highly “developed” United States. Of what value is the right of free speech if, unschooled, it is difficult for me to clearly articulate my difficulties, or am too sick to say anything at all? How much freedom of speech does a single mother with two small children working for minimum wage in the South Bronx have compared to, say, Rupert Murdoch, or the CEO of Mobil-Exxon? To be sure, I have the same “right” to take out a full page ad in the *New York Times* as Murdoch or any other very wealthy person, the only difference between us being that they pay for their ad out of petty cash funds while I have to sell my home to pay for mine. What good is the right to freely dispose of what I own if I don't own anything? What good is the right to freely choose a job if there aren't any that provide a living wage for my family?

If my analysis of this inherent contradiction between first and second generation rights claims is correct, it suggests that rights-bearing autonomous individuals will be no more able to provide adequate answers to these and similar questions in the future than they have done in the past. Confucian role-bearing related persons, however, may be able to dissolve the contradiction, and hence resolve the problems raised by those questions. To appreciate the importance of attempting the effort, we must examine briefly some painful dimensions of the world today, especially with respect to the growing gap between the haves and the have-nots.

Rising Inequality & Social Injustice

In a world of even a roughly equitable distribution of wealth and property, protecting the civil and

political first-generation rights of autonomous individuals and corporations might well be morally, politically, and legally of the utmost importance, infringements thereon to be guarded against at all times. Unfortunately, the real world is rather different. Consider the following from a *Wall Street Journal* article not too long ago:

Forty years ago the world's 20 richest countries had a per capita GDP 18 times greater than that in the world's 20 poorest countries. The most recent statistics indicate the rich countries' GDP is now 37 times higher. Over 1.2 billion people around the world live on less than \$1.00 a day.¹⁷

On the other hand, according to *Forbes Magazine*, there are now 1125 billionaires in the world – up from 852 in 2005 – and their combined wealth grew 18% to over \$4 trillion dollars.¹⁸

And at the peak of the pinnacle, the wealthiest 20 individuals have combined assets that exceed the combined GDP of the 65 least developed countries in 2005.

As awful as these figures are to contemplate, they are made much more awful by considering just how relatively little it would take to begin seriously redressing the imbalance between those who have, and those who have not. The UN Report goes on to say:

For an additional \$45 billion a year, basic health, basic nutrition, basic education, reproductive health and family planning services, and water sanitation facilities could be extended to the entire world's population.¹⁹

How much is \$45 billion? It is less than 5% of the 2008 Defense budget – which does not include the supplements for Iraq and Afghanistan each year.²⁰ It represents less than 1/100 of 1% of the world's income in 2005. Or, to quote from the UN Report once again:

A yearly contribution of 1% of the wealth of the 225 richest people could provide universal access to primary education for all, and a 5% contribution would suffice to provide all of the services listed above.²¹

With statistics like these, it is easy to see why so many U.N. members endorse second-generation rights: 168 countries have ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, but the United States is not among them (it is the only developed country not on the list).²²

Closer to home, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that 37 million Americans are living at the poverty level, with 15 million of them living at least 50% below that level, which in 2006 was determined to be \$20,600 annually for a family of 4, a low figure. Almost twice that number of people (57 million) have incomes no more than twice the poverty level, and if they lose their jobs, will almost certainly fall below it: Working for minimum wage, which the Congress has just raised to the un-princely sum of \$6.35 an hour, a full-time worker will earn approximately 12,000 a year, while, the CEOs of the 350 largest U.S. corporations will make that sum in less than two hours.²³ (These 350 CEOs are not, however, at the peak of the “earnings” pinnacle: the top 25 hedge fund managers made more money than all 350 of them together in 2008).

To see how these figures compare with those of other developed countries, we may take the internationally accepted definition of poverty to be the percentage of the population whose annual income is less than half of the median for the country. By this measure, the U.S. ranked 24 out of 25 developed countries in 2001, and things haven’t improved since: using this definition of poverty, and applying it to children -- and here I quote from a recent analysis of a UNICEF study -- “The U.S. ranked dead last among 24 nations studied ...^{22nd} out of 24 on rates of infant mortality and low birth-weight, and the share of children with less than ten books in the home.” 17 million young children in the U.S. live in families whose income is below the poverty line -- even though two-thirds of them have at least one working parent. 47 million Americans have no health insurance, a figure that has gone up every year since 1998. Our prison population is now at 2.4 million, (2006), giving the U.S. the highest per capita incarceration rate in the world. And even by conservative estimates, almost twice as many Americans are homeless.²⁴

Meanwhile, the 450 richest Americans have assets totaling over a trillion dollars, more than the bottom 90% combined. (The 2007 “Forbes 400” list now has only billionaires on it). While many

Americans are sick and/or undernourished, others are paying cash for \$25 million dollar homes, furnishing them with \$60,000 mattresses, parking \$1 million dollar automobiles in \$225 thousand dollar parking spaces in New York City, checking the time with \$600,000 wristwatches and drinking \$2000 glasses of scotch in the bar at a hotel which charges \$28,000 a night for some of its rooms.²⁵

How are these great inequalities possible? How can they be justified?

Individualism as a Hindrance to Social Justice

Returning to the *ethos* of capitalism that dominates most political and legal thinking in this era of globalization, and in the U.S. at present, against this sordid statistical background we can bring into sharper focus the fact that the more well off I am the more I will be disinclined to see second generation rights as genuine rights, for I would surely be less “free” and autonomous and not as well off if I admit that they are, and thus be more willing to be taxed accordingly. Rather will I exercise fully my first-generation right to freedom of speech by buying advertising and providing financial contributions to those candidates for office who will see second generation rights not as rights, but as “hopes” or “aspirations,” as the U.S. Senate has done when it has consistently refused to ratify the U.N. Covenant on Social, Economic & Cultural Rights. Former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick was more explicit and cynical, referring to the Covenant as “a letter to Santa Claus,” while her successor Morris Abrams described such claimed rights as “little more than an empty vessel into which vague hopes and inchoate expectations can be poured.”²⁶

What I am suggesting here from a Confucian perspective is that our preoccupation with maintaining and enhancing the formal freedom and liberty of first generation rights that the courts and the legislature protect, has become significantly a cause of to our failure to achieve greater equality and justice in a capitalist society, and in the world. The “haves” and the “have mores” obviously do not want to disturb the *status quo*, and hence will spend much to insure that they can have even more; highly individualistic no doubt, but not very democratic thinking. Consider the following statement from the well-known theoretical economist Mancur Olson:

A thriving market economy requires, among other things, institutions that provide secure individual rights. The incentives to save, to invest, to produce and to engage in mutually advantageous trade depends particularly upon individual rights to marketable assets – on property rights. Similarly, “...If there is no right to create legally secure corporations, the private economy cannot properly exploit ... productive opportunities.”²⁷

Now it may appear at first that when referring to private property, we are speaking of economic, and hence second generation rights, but in actuality we are not. Excepting the two inaugurating and then repealing Prohibition, all twenty-seven Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are either procedural, or deal with civil and political rights, and being able to keep, own, and be secure with one’s property is stated explicitly in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 1972, Justice Potter Stewart said:

A fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and personal right to property... That rights in property are basic civil rights have long been recognized.²⁸

To see why this is so, we must understand that the concept of a right to property does not refer either to physical possession, nor is it a relation holding between owners and things; rather is it a set of relations between owners and other persons with respect to things, from which it follows that those with a great deal of money to buy things will have far more “rights” with reference to real property, material goods and services, than those persons living in abject poverty.

To illustrate how Olson’s reasoning plays out in practice, and to underscore the significance of giving first-generation property and economic rights primacy over second generation economic rights, We need only look, for example, at plant closings by corporations relocating overseas in the past few decades, from the closing of steel mills in the 1970s and 1980s to everything from cotton mills, automobile plants and toy factories in the past twenty years. *A number of these plants were closed even though they were making a profit;* yet not only did the government do nothing to prevent

the closings, the courts upheld the rights of the corporations to *refuse to sell the factories to the local town and/or union* that attempted to buy them in order to maintain production and employment.²⁹

Similarly, the government does nothing to stop the corporations still operating plants or offices in the U.S. from eliminating or greatly reducing their contributions to pension and/or health plans, at times in violation of contracts signed with the unions.

But when individual civil and political rights are sacrosanct, there is little that can be done to prevent these untoward actions. My point here is not simply to upbraid corporations and the federal government – much as they all deserve such – but is conceptual: If no one can abridge my freedom to do whatever I wish with what is legally mine, then those corporations are only claiming their legitimate civil and political rights in closing plants and letting them sit idle instead of selling them to another buyer. But if we think workers have a right to security in their jobs so long as they competently perform them, a right to expect their pension plans and health coverage to remain in effect -- all while the company continues making a profit or at least is breaking even -- then these corporate actions, governmental non-interference, and court support, all become morally suspect, and would, in a truly decent and democratic society, very probably not be permitted.

By challenging first generation human rights grounded in the vision of autonomous individuals in this way, it may seem that I am at least implicitly championing one form of totalitarianism or another, Stalinist or Fascist. But these are not the only philosophical alternatives and are seen as such largely because of the effectiveness of the propaganda championing at all costs the capitalist ideology grounded in the concept of the free, rational, self-interested autonomous individual which leads in turn to dichotomies between selfishness and altruism in the moral sphere, and between individualism and collectivism in the political sphere. These dichotomies have been much too sharply drawn, in my opinion, making it difficult for us to entertain very new, or very old ways of envisioning what it is to be a human being, and concomitant views of freedom and social justice.

The Case for the Confucians

To sum up the overall argument: Without diminishing the great importance of first

generation civil and political rights when applied to flesh and blood human beings, and with admiration for the national and international NGOs that police their abuse, it must nevertheless be emphasized that when taken to the personal and corporate levels, respect for civil and political rights doesn't cost very much, requires precious little effort, and serves as a bulwark protecting the rich and the powerful in our legislative and legal systems, pretty much guaranteeing the continued refusal to recognize and implement second generation rights both nationally and internationally. We must understand how civil and political rights contribute to that concentration of wealth and power, with justice continuing to elude us, democracy eroding, and the achievement of freedom and dignity but a distant dream for many of the world's peoples, in the U.S. no less than in the less developed countries of this increasingly fragile planet. We need look no further than the very recent (1/20/10) U.S. Supreme court decision that obliging corporations to limit campaign contributions to political candidates was a violation of their first amendment rights of freedom of speech.

Let me reiterate that in pressing the case for the role-bearing, relational person of early Confucianism, I am by no means suggesting that the concepts of freedom and liberty should be disvalued; the more we are constrained, the less can we effect the most appropriate interactions with the others who define us, and whom we define. But by focusing on the autonomous individual it continues to be possible to maintain a "blame the victim" rationale for ignoring the plight of the less fortunate despite its absurdity, and the great conceptual gap between negative and positive rights will remain unbridgeable; individual freedom is purchased at the expense of social justice. U.S. history provides few warrants for optimism that first generation civil and political rights, grounded in the concept of human beings basically as autonomous individuals, will ever lead to our embracing the second generation economic, social and cultural rights enumerated in Articles 22 – 27 of the UN Universal Declaration.

Role-bearing related persons central to the Confucian vision, on the other hand, take second-generation rights very seriously, yet do not need to ignore, or even downgrade, what the first ten amendments to the Constitution are designed to protect. If we are at all times to do what is appropriate in order that the other flourishes, then surely they will flourish more as we let them speak

freely, (and we also *listen* to them). We might disagree with what they say, and we may remonstrate with them for what they say; but why would we want to prevent them from speaking? In just the same way, why would I not want you to have a wide circle of companions? Why would I deny you the opportunity to worship as you saw fit when I see how sustaining it is for you? In sum, to the extent that what civil and political rights guarantee aids our flourishing, of course we must all support and strengthen those rights.

It should thus be clear that within the Confucian vision it is easy and straightforward to move conceptually from second to first generation rights, but the converse does not hold; role-bearing related persons can be far more inclusive in acknowledging the full spectrum of rights adumbrated in the UN Declaration than proponents of individualism have done thus far, or seem capable of doing in the future, especially in the U.S.

If the Confucian vision of the role-bearing related person remains hazy, it is due in significant measure to the pervasiveness in contemporary American society of the other vision, that of the rights-bearing autonomous individual, a vision that not only affects how we think about human rights, but about most other elements of our lives as well. A great many people would agree with Aldous Huxley that

We live together, we act on, and react to, one another; but
always and in all circumstances we are by ourselves. The
martyrs go hand in hand into the arena; they are crucified
alone.³⁰

Everyone with eyes to see must be aware at least to some extent of the manifold problems attendant on Huxley's description of the individual self, but Americans do not yet take those problems as seriously as we should, evidenced clearly by the fact that barren notions of freedom and autonomy remain fundamental in almost all contemporary social, moral, and political theorizing, undergirds our courts, and the development and implementation of our domestic and foreign policies.

Individualism is a deeply-rooted ideology in the capitalist U.S., and in my opinion is significantly responsible for much of the malaise increasingly infecting it. Worse, insisting that we are basically autonomous individuals is not only to distort badly what actual human beings are like, I think, it can all too easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy, especially in a consumptive, property and thing-oriented society like our own: the more we believe we are isolated, rational, self-interested profit-maximizing atoms, the more we will incline to become such, instantiating the horrific vision of the poet A.E. Housman: “I, a stranger and afraid// In a world I never made.”

To be sure, some exemplary groups continue to struggle against human degradation by appealing to the concept of autonomous individuals in their arguments; Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Human Rights Watch come immediately to mind. But again: as wealth and power become more concentrated in fewer individual and/or corporate hands, as capitalism expands its global reach, we may expect injustice and inequality to grow rather than shrink, our democratic institutions to continue to decline, our environment to become ever more despoiled, with our personal lives becoming ever more barren.

To anyone familiar with pre-Enlightenment thought in the West the social, political and moral views of the early Confucians will surely not seem foreign. Even if we are not Christians, perhaps we nevertheless do believe we are our brother’s keeper – our sister’s too – and therefore, despite the constant social, economic and political pressure on us to see ourselves first and foremost as individuals, we are nevertheless capable of being moved deeply by the words of the great metaphysical poet and cleric John Donne:

No man is an island, entire unto itself

.....

Any man’s death diminishes me,

for I am involved in mankind.

Therefore do not send to know

for whom the bell tolls;

it tolls for thee.³¹

Confucians hear the bell clearly; can we?³²

¹ For more on role ethics, and how it differs from deontological consequentialist or virtue ethics, see the Introduction to *The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence (Xiaojing): A Philosophical Translation*, by Roger Ames and myself. Forthcoming 2008 from the University of Hawai'i Press.

² One of the scholars who sees clearly the dark side of individualism is C.B. MacPherson. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*. NY: Oxford University Press, 1964.

³ A full account of this concept is *Autonomy*, by Richard Lindley. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1986.

⁴ See *Rationality and Relativism*, edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982.

⁵ Cf. my "On Freedom and Inequality," in *The Aesthetic Turn*, edited by Roger Ames. Chicago & LaSalle, IL: Open Court Pub. Co., 2000.

⁶ Especially political scientists and economists, for without the presupposition of self-interest rational choice theory can do no work.

⁷ The *locus classicus* for Kant's ethics is the *Critique of Practical Reason*, (various editions). This emphasis on reason alone is almost certainly the reason Kant could claim that "...a concept of virtue and morality never entered the heads of the Chinese." Quoted by Julia Ching in her "Chineses Etics and Kant," in *Philosophy East & West*, vol. 28, no. 2, April, 1978.

⁸ Here the *locus classicus* is Mill's *Utilitarianism*, (various editions).

⁹ One of the basic themes of his *Walden*, (various editions).

¹⁰ All translations from the *Lun Yu* are from the Translation by Roger Ames and myself, *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*. NY: Ballantine/Random House, 1998.

¹¹ This claim has been well argued by David Wong. See his "If We are not by Ourselves, If we are not Strangers," in *Polishing The Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr.* Edited by Marthe Chandler and Ronie Littlejohn. NY: Global Scholarly Publications, 2008. It is perhaps not inappropriate in this context of questioning the existence of an essential self to paraphrase one of the more famous passages in Hume's *Treatise*, replacing "perception" with "role" *salva veritate*, making suitable adjustments elsewhere:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some Particular role or other, of son or father, lover or friend, student or teacher, brother or Neighbor. I never can catch *myself* at any time apart from a role, and never can observe anything except from the viewpoint of a role . . . If anyone upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess that I can no longer reason with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I. and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls *himself*; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.

A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, "Of Personal Identity," p. 300. Hammondsworth, 1985.

¹² See n.1.

¹³ Mencius was well aware of this, as 1A7 shows clearly. A contemporary discussion is David Brooks, "Longer Lives Reveal the ties that bind Us," in the *New York Times*, October 20, 2005, the Op-Ed page.

¹⁴ But in the way some contemporary Western philosophers define "moral particularism." See the anthology by that title edited by Brad Hooker and Margaret Little. Oxford, UK: Macmillan Palgrave, 2000.

¹⁵ See n. 7.

¹⁶ Some of the material in this section, and sources, are taken from my “Two Loci of Authority” in *Confucian Cultures of Authority*, edited by Peter Herschok and Roger Ames. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Quoted in *USA Today*, April 3, 2007. “The Trillion Dollar Income Shift, Part 1,” by Jock Rasmus. *Z Magazine*, February, 2007.

¹⁹ *UN Development Report – 2000*. p. 62. Things have not improved, as the 2003 report shows clearly pp.40-41.

²⁰ *Washington Post* August 29, 2007, p. A1.

²¹ *UN Human Development Report – 2000*, *op. cit.*

²² *Rights: International Instruments. Human* Geneva, Switzerland, 1997 (updated).

²³ Friends Committee on National Legislation *Washington Newsletter*, July, 2007. See also *The Nation*, 8/13-20/2007.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ The sources for these obscene figures are, respectively, “The Trillion dollar Income Shift,” *op. cit.*; *NY Times*, July 12, 2007, p. D1; *Ibid.*, p. A1; *Ibid.*, June 10, 2007, Book Review, p. 8; and the *Hightower Lowdown* August, 2006, p. 6.

²⁶ Both Kirkpatrick and Abrams are quoted by Noam Chomsky in his *Rogue States*. Boston: South End Press, 2000, p. 112.

²⁷ “Development Depends on Institutions,” *College Park International*, April, 1996, p. 2.

²⁸ Quoted in James Ely, Jr., in *The Guardian of Every Other Right*. NY: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 141.

²⁹ One stark example is described by Marc Cooper in “A Town Betrayed,” in *The Nation*, June 14, 1997.

³⁰ *The Doors of Perception*. London: Penguin, 1963, p. 12.

³¹ *No Man is an Island*, edited by Rivers Scott. London: The Folio Society, 1997, Sermon XVII.

³² I am grateful, as is so often the case, to Roger Ames for his close reading of the penultimate draft of this Paper, and suggestions for improving it.