Skip to content

Meeting of the Circle in Cambridge MA 25-26 Feb 2005

Meeting of the Circle in Cambridge  MA 25-26 Feb 2005: Moral dimensions of the Public Discourse: the legacy of the Social Summit Revisited

 

Attendance

 

Twenty-five participants, including five persons working at the United Nations in New York.

 

Themes and Questions included in the Agenda

 

Theme 1: Moral philosophy and the spirit of the time

  • What is the meaning and significance of the current preoccupation with ethical issues?
  • What can be said, today, about the foundations of morals?
  • What is the significance of a moral of intention?

 

Theme 2: Moral issues in the political discourse

  • What would be the features of a “morally perfect” political discourse?
  • Are there moral issues that ought to be left outside of the political discourse?
  • Or, evoking again the “morally perfect” ideal, are intellectual quality and moral prudence and moderation more important than the distinction between a private and a public sphere of morality?

 

Theme 3: Relevance of the values advocated by the Social Summit

  • What is the current understanding of the idea of equality? And of its relations with personal liberty and economic freedom?
  • What is the relevance and appeal of the idea expressed in the Declaration adopted in Copenhagen that “ societies (our underlining) must address the material and spiritual (our underlining) needs of individuals, their families and the communities in which they live”?
  • What about the idea of progress?
  • What are the conditions for an effective and respectful cooperation between “partners” with different power, interests and conceptions of society?

 

In addition, the agenda included an item on Project of a conference in 2005, to mark the ten year anniversary of the convening of the World Summit for Social Development. This idea did not materialize, although the seminar organized in September 2005 with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Harvard-Yenching Institute can be considered an offspring of this project (see below).

 

Highlights of the debate

 

The renewed interest in moral philosophy, notable at least in the western part of the world, might be explained by the sentiment – certainly widespread among intellectuals – that the dominant modern culture has lost its moral bearings. It is felt that after successive waves of philosophical currents – notably positivism, utilitarianism, existentialism, structuralism and deconstruction – have undermined the foundations upon which the human person seeks distinctions between the true and the false and the morally acceptable and the morally wrong, it would be useful to go back to a reflection on the sources of virtue, wisdom and happiness.

 

That the West, and, under its influence, the world as a whole, is confronted with a moral crisis, is a sort of recurrent theme of the Triglav Circle. Excess of individualism and of materialism, excessive deference for the “miracles” of science and technology and for the “fruits” of economic activity and growth, difficulty to recognize the Other as a being equally endowed with rights and dignity, lack of civility and easy recourse to violence, predatory attitude towards nature, are among the failures of development and modernity that are regularly denounced. At this particular meeting, the seemingly inexhaustible greed that accompanies the dissemination of capitalism and the intrusion of money in all institutions and forms of social relations that characterizes globalization were particularly targeted.  The African continent also, appears to suffer from the various forms of corruption that flourish upon broken social structures and social mores. Yet, mezzo voce, for it is always difficult to express confidence in present trends in an organization devoted to a “renaissance of the human spirit”, other voices evoke the well-known fact that all-along history intellectuals and artists have deplored decadence and moral decay. Concern over moral issues is certainly not new. Moreover, a greater consciousness of the shortcomings of the current state of the world – for example of the degradation of the natural environment – is a sign of moral awareness and a first step towards redress. And, one could cite undisputable manifestations of moral progress such as the trend towards more equality between women and men.

 

Such debate between “pessimists” and “optimists” is bound to remain inconclusive. Provided it does not dominate the Circle’s discussions, it is useful, because it helps protagonists to avoid the intellectual comfort that is so surely destructive of personal and institutional progress. And, after all, interest in moral philosophy does not have to be justified and fed by a catalog of the problems besetting the modern world. And even less by historical comparisons that are always hampered by subjectivity and prejudices. Besides, intellectual and philosophical pursuits do not need external justifications or blessings.

 

Should, however, moral philosophy, with its assumptions, conclusions and interrogations, become an open and explicit subject of political debate? How to interpret and assess the current taste of public officials for pronouncements on morality and values? And, what about the interest of private corporations for ethics? In other words, should the Triglav Circle, geared as it is towards an enrichment of the moral and spiritual content of the public discourse, rejoice of the currently great appetite of public and private powers for morals and ethics?

 

The most elaborate answer provided to this question was, at this meeting, negative. First of all, common sense and historical knowledge concur on one observation: proclaimed attachment to virtue and adhesion to moral principles are a-priori suspicious and, ex-post, consistently deceitful. Individually, the eulogist of one’s own moral greatness is Tartufe, or the hypocrite. This same person is also often willing to be Savonarola, or the preacher who will send to Hell those who do not respect his injunctions. For, references to God, appeals to morality, intolerance and ultimately cruelty and abuses of power tend, unfortunately, to go together. Leaders and political regimes with a strong moral language and a Manichean vision of the Good and the Evil, the Truth and the False are consistently authoritarian and prompt to resort to violence to impose their views and interests. And, apart from these extremes, politicians and governments anxious to promote the common good while respecting citizen’s freedom and dignity ought to refrain from proclamations of their attachment to virtue and public morality. What matters is accountability and the practical tools and processes to achieve it, such as statistics and indicators and proper reporting. The moral behavior of public authorities has more chance to be enhanced through institutionalized accountability, requiring in particular free and pluralistic media, than through statements and debates on values. And the same caution, discretion and constant efforts at transparency and accountability should be expected from international organizations, as well as from corporations.

 

The exponent of this political philosophy, which might be labeled liberal humanism, added that there were indeed universally shared values, such as fairness, compassion, courage and honesty, which are transmitted from generation to generation through example and imitation (hence the critical role of the parents in setting the moral fiber of a society). Giving the good example,  from the elders as well as from public figures and institutions, is indeed critical and directives, admonitions and repressive measures have little effectiveness.

 

Liberal humanism is the heir of the European Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries. Together with might be called social liberalism (the forms of socialism and social democracy that did not flirt with communism) it gave birth to modern democracy and has been the source of inspiration for, among other major documents, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No political doctrine has such an impressive record of achievements, especially with regard to the always difficult reconciliation of freedom and justice. Such reconciliation is apparently particularly problematic under liberal capitalism, which is the currently dominant avatar of liberalism and which, contrary to liberal humanism, does not place any limit on the reign of money and the “marketisation” of social and human relations.

 

Most if not all participants at this gathering of the Triglav Circle shared the liberal humanist credo as far as the basic relationships between morals and power are concerned: calls to morality, pretence at virtue and at ownership of the truth are always suspect and dangerous. Humility, moderation and prudence are precious qualities of those who have the responsibility to lead their fellow citizens. Beyond this point, which is indeed critical for the building and preservation of democracy, liberal humanism, as articulated at this meeting, was subjected to a number of questions and the moral discourse was enriched with complementary , if not alternative perspectives on  the sources of decent human behavior.

 

A first question was on the role of religion in human affairs. Liberal humanism could also be called secular humanism. Its proponents are keenly aware of the crimes of religious fanatics and of the conflicts and wars that have been prompted or justified by religious creeds. God has been consistently used and misused to satisfy human passions, first of all the passion for power and domination. Liberal humanists are also observing with consternation the many signs of a resurgence of religious intolerance and fanaticism and the rise of fundamentalism as a comfortable answer to the uncertainties and challenges of modernity. They therefore believe more than ever in the need to keep religious matters in the private sphere of human affairs. To the extent that they are necessary, or, as long as they have to be tolerated, religious institutions should not be permitted to meddle with issues of public interest. Liberal humanists, whether they are atheists, deists, or themselves adepts of a religious faith, wish to keep the political realm under the management of Reason. And the same applies to morals: when derived from religious precepts, morality tends to ignore the freedom of the individual, above all freedom of thought.

 

Such position generated a number of observations. The reading of history putting religion as a major source of obscurantism and violence is indeed backed by facts, but another reading is perfectly legitimate. Religions, including the main monotheist faiths, have long been the only sources of meaning in the lives of people. They have given purpose, hope and moral direction. Prophets and saints have been models of compassion, altruism and wisdom. And, today, it would be evidently false to assimilate and reduce religion to its various fundamentalist, obscurantist and intolerant avatars. Legions of decent and intelligent people are, throughout the world, finding in their faith guidelines for organizing their lives and their relations with others and the world. Countless acts of charity and justice are accomplished, individually or through organizations, under the impulse and framework of religion. Besides, whether one sees its overall moral and political influence as negative or positive in the present world, religion does exist and shows no sign of disappearance. Should this resilience be attributed only to an inherent weakness of Man, or to the still insufficient development of Science, or to the persuasive power of false prophets and charlatans? Is it still realistic to pretend that religion belongs solely to the private sphere of life and society? Is it not more useful to try to establish, as some liberal humanist intellectuals propose to do, new forms of secularism and new relations between public and religious institutions? Is it not more reasonable to teach in public schools both religions and the imperatives of tolerance and pluralism within the human family, rather than reject all such teaching because of “neutrality” and the protection of the freedom of thought? It was also noted, as a sort of summing up, that the renaissance of the human spirit, dear to Triglavians, will not be achieved by secular means only. Religions are indispensable to this imperative task. And the spiritual realm is perhaps not only of a religious nature, but it would hardly be realistic to ignore religions when advocating a spiritual renewal.

 

The second set of questions/critiques put to liberal humanism touched upon the usefulness of open debates on values and more generally on moral issues. To repeat, the liberal humanist, without necessarily discarding moral philosophy as a domain of academic inquiry, sees only ambiguities and dangers in the placing of ethical and moral issues on public political forums. Being granted that such dangers are real, and that the merits of a politician and political regime have to be gauged in relation to actions rather than proclamations, could it be that reticence and discretion on moral principles and dilemmas ought to be practiced or avoided pending on the circumstances? Aren’t present circumstances in the world justifying reflections and public discussions on the values, moral principles and virtues that ought to underlie peaceful and cooperative relations between social groups, nations and regions? Is it not possible that rejection of an open discussion, for instance on the moral and political principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, be attributable sometimes to arrogance, other times to fear, and in most instances to lack of faith in the ability of public forums to perform a useful role? But then, is a laissez-faire on moral issues a reasonable alternative? Is it not true that such laissez-faire, or such “act and do not debate”, presupposes a degree of faith in the capacity of humankind to solve or muddle through its problems without openly confronting them that history does not quite confirm? Rather than rejecting public debates on values and moral principles and issues, would it not be preferable to reflect on the conditions under which such debates would be possible and fruitful?

 

Related questions pertained to the assumptions on the foundations and transmittals of moral principles and moral sentiments that are contained in liberal humanism. There is no doubt that examples – given by parents, teachers,   religious figures, political leaders – are critical, in a positive as well as negative sense, but, to stay with the transmittal of positive values, aren’t there frequent breakdowns in those virtuous cycles along generations? When these breakdowns occur in a particular community, or nation, or region – and even the most resolutely optimistic humanist would have to concede that there are indeed times of moral regression or at least stagnation – where do the remedies, or reactions, or possibilities for renewal, come from? Is there in humankind a “stock” of moral values that is automatically reactivated when the need arise? Are liberal humanists implicitly relying on a theory of human nature, or natural law, or moral instinct that is sometimes ignored but always “there” to be called upon? Or, are they “neo-positivists” arguing that each culture creates its own morals, as a sort of basic social need, obviously with ups and downs but with certain core values that can be observed across times and across civilizations? Or, would the most consistent liberal humanist retort that these very questions are precisely those that are best left to academic inquiry and that nothing can be gained from a public discussion on the foundations of morals in a political arena? Such prudent reticence perhaps explains why the questions included in the Agenda on the foundations of morals, or on the merits of a moral of intention, or on the ideal moral profile of a public discourse, received little attention at this meeting of the Triglav Circle.

 

Much was evoked, however, on complementary or alternative approaches to moral philosophy. Put in the form of a question: what are, besides or beyond morals, sources of decent human behavior that ought to be tapped to foster harmonious societies and a peaceful world community? Or, what are the perspectives on the human condition that ought to be emphasized to better understand and improve this condition? Besides religion, four such perspectives were mentioned.

 

First, there is need for greater awareness and greater mobilization of the spiritual resources that are available in the world. At the time of the preparation of the Social Summit, Tu Wei Ming had identified three kinds of spiritual resources: the ethico-religious traditions of the modern West, notably Greek philosophy, Judaism and Christianity; those resources derived from non-Western axial-age civilizations, which include Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism in South and Southeast Asia, Confucianism and Taoism in East Asia, and Islam; and, the primal traditions, i.e. native American, Hawaian, Maori and numerous tribal indigenous traditions. It is also imperative to call back the great thinkers of the past, notably Socrates. Traditions and enlightened individuals teach humankind both openness to the world and “rootedness”. The political leaders of today should have two languages: their own and the universal. This is a difficult but urgent combination, because these leaders have no choice but to agree that something has to be done for the world, now. The view was expressed that spiritual resources were actually being mobilized in different parts of the world. The West is late in joining this movement. But there is no alternative, for moral consciousness is the same as spiritual development.

 

Secondly, the cultural perspective ought to be better understood and better integrated in the analyses of public intellectuals and in the political discourse, including at the United Nations. Values, notably moral values, come from what we call “traditions” (a concept which save us from unnecessary controversies on the foundations of morals) and they are embodied, reflected in the institutions that make societies and the world community. A society – and the world – has the possibility to be harmonious when such institutions are diverse, have different functions and objectives, respond to different needs and aspirations of individuals and groups, when institutions, in a word, represent the full range of human values. And diversity reinforces the sharing of the values that are common to all cultures. At present, there is a dominant value (it might be called competition, or money, or greed, or efficiency, or “market”) that is invading all institutions and all cultures, promoting homogeneity and generating violence and conflicts. Cultural poverty is often synonymous with, or at least is a sure warning sign of moral poverty.  A careful analysis of such cultural trends, of culture as a mediator between morals and politics, and a reflection on institutional pluralism would shed light on many current problems, including the deficiencies of the abstract universalism that often seems to characterize the work of the United Nations.

 

Thirdly, aesthetics is a branch of philosophy that is often neglected beyond its dealings with the arts. Yet, people can reach high levels of consciousness and attain a sense of harmony and plenitude with the universe through the experience of beauty either in nature or in artistic creations. It was pointed out at this meeting that a sort of aesthetic imagination ought to be cultivated as an antidote to the various wounds inflicted on the mind by video games and other manifestations of a mercantilist mass culture. The example was given of a survey suggesting that a significant proportion of children exposed to violent films and video-games are unaware that killing is a reprehensible act. The imagination has to be reeducated. Human beings have to be aware of the aesthetic quality of their aspirations, desires and dreams. Seen in that fashion, education in aesthetics is a form of spiritual education.

 

Fourthly, the inclination of the mind and heart to be altruistic, to feel and demonstrate compassion, generosity, solidarity and simply interest for other human beings and humanity at large, this inclination for which there is no more appropriate word than love is the most powerful leverage that humankind has at its disposal for creating a peaceful and harmonious world. It was emphasized that Love is another word for God and that by expressing love in his thoughts and deeds the human being reaches that spark of divinity that is given to all. Love is a sentiment and a way of being that is always in danger to be trivialized. It is commonly reduced to softness or to the mere satisfaction of the sexual instinct. But it is in fact the only source and manifestation of moral greatness. Spirituality itself, without love is only complacent absorption in the self. These convictions were expressed in full awareness of the great difficulties inherent to such a “discourse”. Many words are polluted. And discretion on fundamental matters has a lot of appeal. Yet, taboos are often created by fear and it might be time to mobilize all the facets of the human spirit. Reason has certainly better fruits when shaped by Love rather than by Power, or Greed, or Fear.

 

Points were made in the course of the debate on wisdom. To reach wisdom, rationality and sympathy must be combined. Wisdom is not a virtue appealing to the young. The same with moderation. Is wisdom a privilege, and a burden, of some of the elderly? Somehow, perhaps especially in the West, wisdom is dissociated from creativity, and even from the appetite for life and its bounties. Perhaps the Circle should revisit these notions and try to identify forms of practical wisdom acceptable to a world geared towards technological change, growth and continuous improvements in material levels of living.  In a related context, it was emphasized that evil do exist and manifest itself in various ways. Aside from its geo-political connotations (the “evil-states”), this is not a very popular notion, especially among enlightened intellectuals. References to evil and hell are seen as obscurantist. But this is perhaps because one does not see beyond childish imagery. And, could it be that a negation of Evil leads inexorably to a negation of the Good? How to reject Manicheism without embracing Amorality?

 

The third point of the Agenda, the relevance of the values advocated by the Social Summit, was not ignored. There are several levels at which an assessment of the present relevance of the moral and intellectual message of the Social Summit can be attempted. In the legislative bodies of the United Nations, and to a large extent in the upper echelons of the secretariat of this organization, the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action adopted in 1995 by the World Summit for Social Development (in the presence of 117 heads of State or Government) is largely ignored. The 10th anniversary of the Summit was celebrated in the most discrete manner. The UN Millennium Declaration and more precisely the Millennium Development Goals have replaced the commitments made in Copenhagen on the development agenda of the United Nations (the other world conferences organized by the United Nations before and immediately after the year 2000 have, with some nuances, experienced the same fate, with the exception of the Mexico Conference on Financing for Development). The reduction of poverty, one of the three main objectives adopted at Copenhagen, is central to the Millennium Goals, but with an excessively simplified approach to the nature of the phenomenon, its causes, its manifestations and its remedies. The words “material and spiritual” aspects of the human condition, or their equivalent, cannot be find in any document adopted since 1995 by the legislative bodies of the United Nations. The moral content of the text of the Summit had several explicit practical implications, including on recommendations for taxation, financial transactions and the public financing of essential services. These were ignored, even actively contradicted in official UN circles. Only the curbing of corruption, though with an anti-developing countries bias, has find favor with the powers that dominate the United Nations.

 

Outside this Organization, the situation is less clear. The International Labour Organization has kept alive the objectives of the Summit on employment and in some respects on social integration. Some national governments have also attempted to implement the commitments made in Copenhagen. And, as it is often noted, the non-governmental organization and more generally a variety of social movements have continued to work within the broad moral and political framework outlined in Copenhagen. But they were doing so before (the text of the Summit was not a radical departure from the traditional views of benevolent organizations and political parties on the center and left of the political spectrum) and the hope of those who shaped the Summit and its outcome was to enriched the discourse of the United Nations, and therefore of its Secretariat and its affluent members. This has not happened. Are the reasons for this state of affairs to be found only in the very unfavorable political winds that have cross the world since the last few decades?

 

In the context of this discussion on the Summit, a number of points were made on the issues of equality and equity. They are reflected below in the highlights of the September 2005 meeting of the Circle.

 

 

Back To Top